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Introduction

In 1996, a Democratic president, Bill Clinton, famously declared: "The
era of big [g]overnment is over."' The question for U.S. policymakers and
legal scholars ever since has been: what is taking-indeed, what should
take-the place of the "command-and-control" post-New Deal regulatory
state?
Legal scholarship and pedagogy on the regulatory state are at parallel,
important junctures, and two new books stand at the cutting edge. The first,
Law and New Governance in the EU and the US,2 edited by Griinne de
Bdirca and Joanne Scott, is a collection of works by some of the leading
scholars in the "new governance" field. New governance scholars have both
described and laid the theoretical foundation for what they see as promising
and innovative efforts to address public problems.3 These efforts attempt to
be less hierarchical, more transparent, and more democratic than traditional
top-down forms of regulation.
The second, The Regulatory and Administrative State: Materials, Cases,
Comments,4 by Lisa Heinzerling and Mark Tushnet, is one of the first casebooks for a class on the regulatory state and may have helped persuade
Harvard's faculty that adding such a class to the first-year curriculum was
feasible as part of their recent curricular reform. 5 Moreover, as the first in
Oxford University Press's Twenty-First Century Legal Education series,6 an
unusual foray by the elite academic publisher into books for American legal
education, the book will no doubt be influential at many elite law schools.
Besides Harvard, Stanford is also undertaking significant curricular reform,
1. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, I PUB. PAPERS 79,
79 (Jan. 23, 1996).
2. LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Grdinne de Bfirca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006) [hereinafter LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE].
3. See, e.g., Peter Cane, Review of Executive Action, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
STUDIES 146 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) (discussing administrative law); Christine
Parker & John Braithwaite, Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES, supra, at
119 (discussing regulation for the purpose of furthering "democratic experimentalism"); Michael
Taggart, The Nature and Functions of the State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES,
supra, at 101 (discussing privatization).
4. LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TUSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS (2006).

5. See HLS: News: HLS Faculty Unanimously Approves First-Year Curricular Reform,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2006/10/06_curriculum.php
(last updated Oct. 15, 2006)
[hereinafter HLS Curricular Reform] (discussing Harvard Law School's curricular reform,
including the addition of a first-year course on legislation and regulation). Tushnet teaches at
Harvard, where one of Clinton's chief domestic-policy aides from the second term, Elena Kagan, is
the dean. See HLS Office of the Dean: Dean Kagan Biography, http://www.law.harvard.edu/dean/
bio.php (last updated July 19, 2006).
6. The series is edited by Larry Kramer, the dean of Stanford Law School, which is currently in
the middle of curricular reform, see Tresa Baldas, Several Schools Adjust Their Curriculums,NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 10, 2007, at S1, Sl; Martha Minow, who spearheaded Harvard's effort, see HLS
Curricular Reform, supra note 5 (noting that Minow chaired Harvard's curricular-reform process);
and Tushnet himself. Tushnet also has a chapter in Law and New Governance.
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though focusing more on the second and third years,7 and Dean
Edward
8
Rubin of Vanderbilt is leading an ambitious effort at that school.
In this Review, I aim to link these two books and the developments in
the legal academy for which they stand: the scholarly effort to rethink the
role of the state in the twenty-first century and the curricular effort to make
courses on the regulatory state a core part of legal education. I think both
books are tremendously important and largely succeed on their own terms.
But I argue in this Review that they share a common flaw: a lack of attention
to the "adversarial legalism" that pervades American policymaking and
implementation. 9
Part II of this Review describes the emerging new governance literature,
as captured in Law and New Governance, and suggests future directions for
new governance scholarship. Part III looks at and assesses the pedagogical
approach taken in The Regulatory and Administrative State, locating it in the
context of recent curricular reforms.
Part IV critiques both books on a common ground-a lack of attention
to adversarial legalism and the role of lawyers-and argues that this inadequacy threatens both the explanatory power of new governance as an
overarching regulatory theory and the pedagogical potential of promising
curricular reforms. I argue that a more nuanced account of how new
governance schemes both arise and play out "on the ground" in the culture of
adversarial legalism will help strengthen the theory's explanatory power.
Part V concludes by arguing that both the scholarly and pedagogical developments described here could benefit from greater attention to the other.
II.

Law and New Governance

Under a traditional, command-and-control regulatory model-embodied
in the post-New Deal administrative state in the United States and the harmonization efforts of the European Union-the state sets rules or standards
7. See Baldas, supra note 6, at S I (quoting statements by Dean Larry Kramer that the focus of
curricular reform at Stanford Law School is on the second and third years).
8. See Grace Renshaw, A Memorable Year, VAND. LAW., Summer 2006, at 8, 11, available at
http://grenshaw.ventress.comlawyer/memorable-year.html (discussing broad plans for curricular
reform at Vanderbilt Law School). Rubin is himself a leading scholar in regulatory theory, see, e.g.,
EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE
(2005), and is also chairing the Association of American Law Schools' (AALS) committee on
curriculum development. E-mail from Gloria L. Groover, Human Resources Manager, Association
of American Law Schools, to Rebecca Kalmus, Member, Texas Law Review (Nov. 20, 2007) (on
file with the Texas Law Review). Vanderbilt recently adopted a required four-credit Regulatory
State course in the first year as part of this curriculum-reform effort. See VANDERBILT LAW
SCHOOL'S

CURRICULAR

REFORM

INITIATIVE,

available at http://www.aals.org/documents/

curriculum/documents/VanderbiltCurricularReform.pdf.
9. I borrow this phrase from ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN
WAY OF LAW (2001), where he describes adversarial legalism as a "method of policymaking and
dispute resolution" characterized by formal legal contestation and litigant activism. Id. at 9. Kagan
sees adversarial legalism as "a mode of governance, embedded in the political culture and political
structure of the United States." Id. at 5.
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through the legislature or agencies delegated power by the legislature, and
private actors must comply with those rules. The state enforces those rules
through inspection and other means, sometimes with the help of private attorneys general.
But the command-and-control model has come under attack in the last
few decades on a number of fronts. Primary among them is the inefficiency
and stickiness of the rulemaking process.1 l In a world of uncertainty,
legislatures and agencies are unable to predict what the best rules will be
down the road, and the mechanisms for monitoring and adjusting the rules in
light of experience are severely lacking. I I As Michael Dorf, one of the leading new governance scholars, puts it, "[I]n the conditions of modern life,
people increasingly find that their problem is not so much an inability to persuade those with different interests or viewpoints of what to do; their
problem is that no one has a complete solution to what collectively ails
them." 12 There is also considerable evidence that compliance levels are
disappointingly low.1 3 Finally, scarce state resources mean that agencies are
unable to sufficiently help private actors comply, to enforce the law, or to
monitor and update rules in light of experience.
New governance, then, arises out of this critique of the command-andcontrol model. Under the rubric of democratic experimentalism, scholars
drawing on a pragmatist tradition have presented compelling case studies of
new modes of regulation that incorporate robust public participation,14
benchmarking, and information sharing to solve public problems.
Administrative law scholars are observing that the traditional model of the
administrative state-where regulatory agencies with expertise issue rules
that regulated entities must follow-is giving way to a mode of
"collaborative governance," where agencies and industry representatives
work together to define and revise standards. 15 Together, these scholarly

10. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 3 (1997) ("Regulation is currently under attack from all quarters as inefficient,
ineffective, and undemocratic.").
11. See Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of DemocraticExperimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 267, 278, 278-79 (1998) (stating that "the increasing volatility and complexity of
social and economic circumstances" has made it more difficult for agencies and Congress to
establish uniform rules).
12. Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1269 (2004).
13. See Freeman, supra note 10, at 3 ("[T]hat implementation [of regulation] is inconsistent[]
and that enforcement is at best sporadic are by now uncontroversial claims."); id. at 14-17
(continuing the discussion of enforcement problems).
14. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 323-36 (detailing new methods of regulating, such as
family support services in several states, community policing in Chicago, and military procurement
in the U.S. Navy).
15. See Freeman, supra note 10, at 33, 33-34 (noting that a process where regulated entities
negotiate the substance of a rule with the regulating agency is "increasingly common in both
environmental and health and safety regulation").
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strands make up the field of new governance, a series of
6 efforts to reconceive
the relationship between the state and those it governs.'
Like many new paradigms, new governance defines itself in large part
oppositionally. The kinds of regulation encompassed in the term new
governance tend to be less prescriptive, less top-down, and more focused on
learning through monitoring than compliance with fixed rules. As one
scholar put it, new governance mechanisms share emphasis on regulation
through "centrally coordinated local problem solving."' 1 7 Both in defining
the problem to be addressed and devising solutions, new governance forms
emphasize provisionality and revisability in light of experience. 18 The public
agency acts to help local actors learn from one another about best practices
and ensures transparency and public participation in problem solving. In
such regimes, public and private actors interact in increasingly complex and
collaborative ways to address problems of public policy.
Law and New Governance is an important collection of essays on new
approaches to governance in the United States and the European Union. The
result of a conference at Cambridge University, the essays in this collection
pursue three parallel lines of inquiry. First, the essays are "practical and
empirical"--that is, they provide case studies that describe and evaluate
ongoing experiments in new governance in the United States and the
European Union.19 Second, the essays explore the relationship between law
and new governance, with some exploring the "gap" between the two
domains, others positing that new governance is "transformative" of law, and
others pointing to a "hybrid" approach that might prove enduring. Third, the
essays look at the relationship between new governance and
constitutionalism. In the European Union context, the authors are largely
asking whether new governance mechanisms can help provide a raison
d'etre for the European Union, while in the United States, the new
governance scholars largely pose the model as a possible answer to the
question of what the role of the state is now that the "era of big [g]overnment
is over." I discuss each of these lines of inquiry below.
A. A Mosaic of Experimentation
The regulatory experiments examined in these case studies differ in
their origins. Most of the U.S. examples are what we might call
bootstrapping, bottom-up examples of reform, originating either within

16. For an interesting theoretical account of the emergence of new governance, see Orly Lobel,
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
17. Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 323, 323.
18. Grainne de Btirca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 1, 3.
19. Id.at 1.
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administrative agencies or from particular institutional actors. In the
European Union, however, new governance efforts have been more
deliberate and top-down as the EU Commission has funded and otherwise
promoted research on such efforts. 20 The principal new governance method
in the European Union, known as the Open Method of Coordination,
involves "the setting of guidelines or objectives at EU level with the
elaboration of Member State action plans or strategy reports in an iterative
process intended to bring about greater coordination and mutual learning in
these policy fields." 21 Drawing on the international-relations
literature, some
22
authors discuss this as a form of "soft law.,
The EU experience with new governance started with employment
policy, which Claire Kilpatrick looks at in her essay. She sees EU
employment governance as widespread, but only because of its "limited
newness. ' 23 That is, she looks beyond the key new governance innovation in
this area-the Open Method of Coordination-and examines its linkages to
other key aspects of EU employment governance, like legislation, spending
on employment initiatives, and the establishment of fundamental rights.24 De
Bdirca's own contribution takes the example of an area governed clearly by a
human rights model-EU race-discrimination law-and shows how the EU
Council and Parliament in 2000 adopted a directive to "implement[] the principle of equal treatment"2'5 and left it to states to do so in a new governance
fashion: through "monitoring of workplace practices, collective agreements,
26
codes of conduct, research or exchange of experiences and good practices.
For de Bfuca, this shows the promise of a hybrid model.27
Health care is addressed from both the EU and U.S. perspectives.
Tamera Hervey traces new governance methods that arose from private
litigation in the European Union, explaining how a classic "hard-law"
process led to soft-law new governance. In responding to the litigation, EU
actors developed mechanisms for funding data collection, investments in
technology, and exchanges of best practices on providing health-care

20. Id. at 2.
21. Grainre de Biirca, The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European
Union, 28 EUR. L. REV. 814, 824, 823-24 (2003).
22. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, "Soft Law, " "HardLaw" and
EU Integration, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 65, 65 (noting that the
nonbinding governance relations of new governance are often referred to as soft law).
23. Claire Kilpatrick, New EU Employment Governance and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 121, 121.
24. See id. at 144-45 (discussing other key aspects of EU employment governance).
25. Grainne de Biirca, EU Race DiscriminationLaw: A Hybrid Model?, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 97, 99 (quoting Council Directive 2000/43, tit., 2000 O.J. (L 180)
22, 22 (EC)).
26. Id. at 101 (quoting Council Directive 2000/43, supranote 25, art. 11, at 25).
27. See id. at 119, 118-20 (observing that the European Union's race-discrimination regime has
evolved to combine a traditional "legal rights-based instrument at its core" with a framework that
embodies aspects of a new governance approach).
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services. 28 The new governance practices emerging in the United States
around health care, according to Louise Trubek's account, focus on some of
the same issues, with the traditional rules in the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 199629 leading to the creation of a series
of public and private collaboratives for implementing technology in health
care while protecting data privacy.3 °
Environmental regulation, too, has new governance aspects on both
sides of the Atlantic. In the European Union, environmental assessment has
a long history and, recently, a distinct experimentalist bent, according to the
account by Joanne Scott and Jane Holder. The practice of reason giving and
information pooling can lead to a "feedback loop" that, combined with robust
public participation, can produce better outcomes. 3 1 Similarly, an EU directive for protecting water quality has a distinct new governance feel, with
sharing of best practices and benchmarking across member states. 32 Bradley
Karkkainnen's account looks optimistically at two kinds of legal rules in the
United States: regulatory-penalty defaults that allow parties to contract
around the hard-law requirements and destabilization rights arising from citipublic agencies to adopt collaborative new
zen suits that can induce
33
governance approaches.
Occupational health and safety in the United States, the locus for some
of the harshest critiques of command-and-control regulation, is the subject of
Orly Lobel's account of experimentation. In recent years, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has developed a variety of
"cooperative programmes" that exempt firms with exemplary safety records
from inspections, provide training to firms in targeted industries, and foster
sharing of best practices among firms, trade associations, and unions.34
Though there is some evidence that these programs have had success in reducing accident rates, one of the most promising of such programs-a
Clinton-era effort to target dangerous workplaces-was struck down after the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce successfully challenged it as subject to formal-

28. Tamara K. Hervey, The European Union and the Governance of Health Care, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 179, 188-91.
29. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-19 1, 110 Stat.
1996.
30. Louise G. Trubek, New Governance Practices in US Health Care, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 245, 253-54.
31. See Joanne Scott & Jane Holder, Law and New EnvironmentalGovernance in the European
Union, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 211, 223, 223-24 ("[T]he emergence of
European-level sustainability (or impact) assessment offers an example of a feedback loop in law
and policy making.").
32. Id. at 227.
33. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-ForcingRegulation and Environmental Governance,
in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 293, 295-96.
34. Orly Lobel, Governing Occupational Safety in the United States, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 269, 278-80.
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rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).35
Lobel's account, then, combines optimism with disappointment. She concludes that a "myriad of legal barriers"
must be removed for these new
36
governance efforts to be successful.
Susan Sturm's essay on efforts to help women advance in science and
engineering careers in higher education is perhaps the most cautious and domain specific of these case studies and, in part as a result, among the most
compelling. Sturm demonstrates how the National Science Foundation acted
as a "problem-solving intermediary" to work with university faculty,
department chairs, lawyers, and other stakeholders to break down gender bias
at the University of Michigan.3 7 She illustrates the mechanisms that enabled
people to genuinely collaborate and solve problems,
and begins to explore
38
the preconditions for success in other domains.
Looking across these case studies, new governance seems less a
structural or institutional description and more a description of a particular
epistemic approach toward the task of governance. It draws on John
Dewey's pragmatist notion of learning by doing, 39 and with its emphasis on
benchmarking and rolling best practices, draws from the "lean production"
model of business organization.40
The case studies are offered in both a descriptive and normative spirit.
New forms of governance are emerging, according to these authors, and for
improved public-policy outcomes, the more new governance, the better.
Together, the essays form a mosaic that is largely, if not unequivocally,
bright.
B. Are Law and New Governance Compatible?
If, however, new governance regimes are not a set of rules passed by
democratic institutions that must be followed by others, are they really law?
As Charles Sabel and William Simon, two of the leading new governance
theorists, articulate the concern, doubts emerge as to whether new
governance forms can still be "law in the sense of holding officials
accountable for their acts and assuring that citizens are otherwise secure in

35. Id. at 279.
36. Id. at 287, 287-88.
37. Sturm, supra note 17, at 326, 337-59.
38. Id. at 323-25.
39. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence:Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 37, 37 & n.2 (referring to John Dewey's conception
of democratic government as support for using the term pragmatist to describe mainstream
jurisprudence).
40. See id. at 37-38 (arguing that the lean production model contradicts basic premises of
mainstream legal theory).
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the enjoyment of their rights."4' Most of these authors take on this question
in one form or another and arrive at different answers.
For a few of the authors, there is a gap between law and new
governance that may be insurmountable. On one version of this thesis, law is
simply blind to new governance schemes, as evidenced most distinctly by the
failure of the EU Constitution to mention such forms of regulation.42 In
another, more dangerous account for new governance proponents, law
actively resists or obstructs attempts at new governance. An example is
Lobel's account of how the courts struck down an innovative occupationalhealth-and-safety program because it did not comply with formal rulemaking
requirements.4 3
For most of the authors, though, law and new governance can interact in
fruitful ways. Grdinne de Btrca's contribution tells a successful hybrid story
of how judicially enforceable rights of nondiscrimination are furthered by
spreading best practices to promote equality.4 4 Scott and Holder's discussion
of the water-framework directive in the European Union is another example
of this sort of hybrid: binding laws coupled with new governance implementation regimes.45 Louise Trubek explains how medical malpractice litigation
in the United States can lead to new governance mechanisms that improve
the quality of care. 46 For these authors, law and new governance can peaceably coexist.
For Sabel and Simon, transformation of law by new governance is
inevitable and desirable. They remind readers of the "enduring insight of
nineteenth-century social theory that great innovations only arise in conditions that undermine their antecedents. 4 7 New forms of governance are
emerging because of the limits of law, and further undermining of law ought
to be embraced.
New governance also presents, directly and indirectly, a critique of and
(for some) an intentional challenge to the rights-based model of legal
liberalism.
For progressives seeking to strengthen norms like
antidiscrimination, the road to success is not by "claiming rights," as in a traditional regulatory model, but by "solving problems," as in new
governance.48 Simon uses the heuristic device of Toyota's lean production

41. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without Sovereignty, in
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 395, 395.
42. See de Bdsrca & Scott, supra note 18, at 11 ("The formal constitutional framework of the
EU... seems largely blind to the spreading practices of new governance.").
43. See Lobel, supra note 34, at 279-80.
44. See de Birca, supra note 25, at 97.
45. See de Birca & Scott, supra note 18, at 8.
46. Trubek, supra note 30, at 257.
47. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 396.
48. See William H. Simon, Solving Problems Vs. Claiming Rights: The PragmatistChallenge
to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004) (criticizing traditional legal liberalism
and favoring the problem-solving pragmatist vision).
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model, calling new governance Toyota jurisprudence.4 9 Under this model,
stakeholders (like Toyota's workers and managers) collaborate to reduce
pollution, minimize workplace injuries, raise the academic achievement of
50
the disadvantaged, and achieve other normatively attractive goals.
For defenders of conventional notions of law, a primary objection to this
approach, though, is that of "legitimacy" or "accountability." Sabel and
Simon describe the concern this way:
The deep worry here is that the explicit provisionality of new
governance framework laws obligates those who "follow" the legal
rules to re-write them in the act of applying them; that this revision is
at the discretion of those who do the revising; and that this inevitable
exercise of discretion is incompatible with the kinds of accountability
on which citizens of a democracy rightly insist in the elaboration of
5
administrative rules and constitutional rights. 1
But the very notion of accountability as a meaningful concept has been
undermined, as Sabel and Simon point out.
Under the traditional,
hierarchical notion of principal-agent accountability, the principal-a
democratically elected legislature-hands down rules, and the administrative
agent implements those rules, 5 2 disciplined if she goes astray by an
independent judiciary tasked with enforcing accountability as a "matter of
pedigree., 53 If this account was ever realistic, it is no longer. The legislature
is simply not able to lay down rules with enough specificity so as to eliminate discretion. In such a regime, the new governance theorists argue, a
more "dynamic accountability," where agents are forced to transparently justify their decisions and are evaluated by peers making similar decisions,
better fulfills the desideratum of a government that is responsive to its
citizens.54
The new governance scholars welcome the challenge that new
governance poses to law. Many see the concept of law as no longer useful in
analyzing the modern regulatory state, and they are not alone. As another
prominent U.S. scholar of regulatory theory recently put it, perhaps we ought
to "bracket the concept of law" altogether, "suspend[ing] its claim to describe some aspect of our society in a useful or convincing way" and deploy

49. Simon, supra note 39, at 37.
50. Simon, supra note 48, at 181-86.
51. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 397-98.
52. In administrative law scholarship, this idea was traditionally referred to as the "transmission
belt" model. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470, 470-71 (2003). In a more recent model of
the administrative state, the president is the democratically elected principal directing the agencies.
See generally Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
53. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 398; see also RUBIN, supra note 8, at 144-45 (similarly

describing the idea of legitimacy as medieval, with its origins in determining the status of the king's
heir in a hereditary monarchy).
54. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 400,400-01.
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the alternative concept of "policy and implementation" in understanding
today's administrative state.55
C. Can New Governance Achieve ConstitutionalStatus?
Though some new governance scholars are content to explore its
domain-specific applications, its most ambitious proponents see it as the
answer to big questions of constitutional scale.56 In Europe, scholars see it as
the answer to the question: what is the European Union for exactly? 57 In the
United States, the question might be: what is the future of liberal constitutional theory? 58 Or put differently, what is a progressive vision of the role of
the state now that our most 59recent Democratic president has declared the "era
of big [g]overnment" over?
But in both places, the questions remain largely the same: is new
governance as a mode of regulation more of a domain-specific model, or is it
small-c constitutional? What are the conditions for its success? What are the
obstacles to its scalability? Is it compatible with existing notions of
constitutionalism?
The authors differ on the extent to which new governance mechanisms
are already a fundamental part of EU constitutionalism. Some note with disappointment that the principal EU new governance mechanism-the Open
Method of Coordination-was deliberately left out of the EU Constitution
and constitutional treaties, ostensibly an indicator that it will never play a
major role. 60 Sabel and Simon, however, seem to treat new governance as
already fundamental, seeing the new governance mechanism of peer review
as "ubiquitous" in many areas of EU governance, "incipient" in others, and

55. RUBIN, supra note 8, at 203.
56. The authors are using the term constitutional in the British sense, not the American version
hinging on a written constitution. The use here is more akin to the way Mark Tushnet defines a
"constitutional order" as a "reasonably stable set of institutions through which a nation's
fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period, and the principles that guide those
decisions." MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 1 (2003).

57. See Neil Walker, EU Constitutionalism and New Governance, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 15, 15 (explaining that the relationships between constitutionalism
and new governance reveal something about the peculiar regulatory dynamic of the European
Union).
58. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalismfor Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 357, 357 (2003) ("[T]he idea of an experimentalist constitutionalism ... would seem to
offer an extremely promising course for liberal constitutional theory."); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-statutes: The New American Constitutionalism, in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 320, 321

(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (arguing for a "new American constitutionalism,"
where important changes in public norms and constitutional principles are developed incrementally
in legislatures and agencies rather than in courts).
59. See TUSHNET, supra note 56, at 171-72, ("[D]emocratic experimentalism remains the most
promising candidate for a theory of government activity in the new constitutional order.").
60. See, e.g., de Bfirca & Scott, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that EU constitutional texts are
conspicuously devoid of the many European new governance initiatives).
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"now routinely used" to address new problems and devise new approaches to
old ones. 6' In other work, Sabel has argued that the "deliberative polyarchy"
at the core of new governance schemes may well be the raison d'tre of the
European Union. 62 New governance may have more currency in the
European Union simply because the very purpose of the European Union is
still up for grabs in a way that it is not in the United States.
In the United States, the constitutional issue is perhaps more difficult.
Even before the issue of scalability is faced, there is the challenge of
compatibility. Can new governance, with its "flagrant disrespect" for the
distinction between lawmaking and enforcement or implementation be consistent with a constitutional order that relies on separation of powers? 63 The
new governance theorists essentially take the position that strict separation of
powers is a myth, as evidenced by the frequent need for dialogue among the
branches of government.64
A related objection, particularly from those defending legal liberalism,
is the perceived need to maintain a robust role for courts in protecting rights.
In his essay, Tushnet thinks that liberals cannot have it both ways, holding
onto judicial protection of "fundamental" rights but encouraging innovative,
nonjudicial methods of enforcement for new rights or values. 65 The answer
that new governance theorists provide is peer review: the use of
benchmarking institutions to horizontally (unlike the vertical, judicial-review
model) engage "elements of civil society" in interpreting and protecting fundamental values.66
Even if new governance is compatible with constitutionalism, can it
reach constitutional scale? In fact, we currently have an ongoing experiment
on that very question: the principal domestic policy innovation of the current
Republican Administration, No Child Left Behind (NCLB). NCLB passed in
2001 with overwhelming bipartisan support and is currently up for
reauthorization. 67 New governance scholars greeted NCLB, and the state-

61. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 402.
62. Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in GOVERNING
WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS 345, 362-

73 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003).
63. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 398 ("[N]ew governance seems radically unsettling
because of its flagrant disrespect for the distinction between enactment (or law making) and
enforcement (or law application) on which principal-agent accountability depends.").
64. See id. at 410-11 (discussing the periodic dialogue between different branches of the U.S.

government).
65. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Governance and American Political Development, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 381, 393 ("[L]iberals simply cannot both (1) be skeptical
about the importance of the courts in a new constitutional order and still insist, as the interest-group
constituencies of the older order require (2) that the heart of those constituencies' policy agendas be
protected by the courts against erosion.").
66. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 400, 407.
67. Maria Glod, Congress is Urged to Enhance "No Child" Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2008, at
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level reforms in Texas and Kentucky on which it was based,68 with great
excitement. 69 The law appears to act at the national level much like the
European Union's Open Method of Coordination operates at the supranational level: setting goals but leaving it to the states to come up with plans for
achieving the goals.7 °
Though it constituted an unprecedented federal level of involvement in
state and local education policy, states and local school districts were granted
autonomy to devise their own plans for achieving progress, and even for defining the standards themselves. 71 In return, the federal government required
accountability measures including data to ensure that students, disaggregated
by race and income, were making "adequate yearly progress. 7 2 Public
participation was guaranteed by provisions requiring the federal Department
of Education to include parent representatives on a committee that would
review the implementing regulations 73 and other provisions giving parents
the right to get information from their school districts about the qualifications
of their children's teachers.7 4
If NCLB is successful, it would be strong evidence that large-scale new
governance regulation could work in the United States and might have broad
political
support as the basis for any new "constitutional order" in the United
75
States.

The jury is still out on the success of NCLB. On the positive sideindeed, this may make anything else mere quibbles-there is substantial
evidence that the math and reading scores of disadvantaged students have
gone up since the passage of the law. 76 On the other side of the ledger,

68. See generally James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 183, 231-66 (2003) (discussing education reforms in Texas and Kentucky).
69. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The FederalNo Child Left Behind Act and the
Post-desegregationCivil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1706 (2003) (praising No Child
Left Behind because it "encourages the development of just the kind of locally, experientially, and
consensually generated standards whose absence in the past has discouraged courts from carrying
through with their initial commitments to desegregated, educationally effective schools"); Liebman
& Sabel, supra note 68, at 304 (observing that the school-reform movement "commands attention as
an innovative response by civil society and the courts to the remaking of the schools").
70. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 1721-24 (discussing the standards set for state
education by No Child Left Behind).
71. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § I1 lI(b)(1)(A), 115 Stat. 1425,
1444 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (Supp. V 2005)).
72. Id. § I ll(b)(2)(C), 115 Stat. at 1446.
73. See id. § I IlI(e)(1)(B), 115 Stat. at 1456.
74. Id. § Illl(h)(6)(A), 115 Stat. at 1461.
75. See TUSHNET, supra note 56, at 1 (defining "constitutional order" as "a reasonably stable
set of institutions through which a nation's fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period,
and the principles that guide those decisions").
76. See CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, ANSWERING THE QUESTION THAT MATTERS MOST: HAS
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT INCREASED SINCE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND? 51-60 (2007) (describing a

narrowing of the gap between students from historically lower performing subgroups and those
from historically higher performing subgroups, while average test scores increased overall). The
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teachers report increased time "teach[ing] to the test," which may crowd out
other important educational goals." Scholars and policymakers have raised
the question of whether the benefits of the law outweigh the unintended consequences of NCLB, including encouraging states to lower academic
standards, pushing poor and minority students out of schools, and creating an
environment that discourages strong teachers from taking jobs in schools
with high numbers of disadvantaged students.78
Is this a successful regulatory model both for educational policy and
other domains? Again, the jury is still out. For new governance scholars, the
model's strength is its ability to learn from experience and update both the
goals of the regulatory scheme and the means in light of experience. In the
NCLB context, states can both learn from their own experience and the experience of other states through the benchmarking coordinated at the federal
level. But when one talks about experimenting at a local level in light of uncertainty about how best to proceed, one thinks of the familiar idea of states
as "laboratories of democracy."
So how exactly is this different? Indeed, one of Louise Trubek's main
examples of new governance in U.S. health care, the federal State Children's
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), sounds like plain old federalism,
providing money to insure more children but allowing states to come up with
programs for how to do it.7 9 In his essay on "new environmental
governance," Bradley Karkkainen describes the Clean Air Act as a
"cooperative federalism" scheme where the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) establishes standards and leaves it to the states to develop
"State Implementation Plans" to regulate emissions, and monitor and enforce
compliance. 80 If the EPA deems the state plan inadequate, a "Federal
Implementation Plan" serves as a backstop, and Karkkainen points to this
arrangement as an innovative "regulatory penalty default" scheme." But it is
not clear how distinctive these regulatory schemes are from many others in
our system of federalism.
Even if it is different, is the new governance, NCLB model really
better? One leading scholar of education policy, Harvard's Richard Elmore,
thinks not, pointing out that before NCLB, states were experimenting with
various kinds of performance-based accountability, but NCLB "narrows the
domain of experimentation drastically and hence limits the amount we can

causal link to passage of the law, however, is far from clear. See id. at 4 ("We cannot say to what
extent test scores have gone up because of NCLB ....
").
77. COMM'N ON No CHILD LEFT BEHIND, ASPEN INST., BEYOND NCLB 19 (2007); see id.

(relating claims that the high-stakes nature of an annual-testing procedure has driven teachers to
emphasize rote instruction of the subjects being tested over creative learning techniques).
78. See, e.g.,
James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 932, 934 (2004).
79. See Trubek, supra note 30, at 259-61.
80. Karkkainen, supra note 33, at 308.

81. Id.at 309.
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know.,,8' Annual testing is one way to measure performance, but it is not the
and may not be the best way. Under NCLB, it is the mandatory
only 8way
3
way.
From a different direction, scholars have criticized NCLB for its mix of
federal involvement with flexibility left to the states-precisely the recipe
prescribed by new governance advocates. As James Ryan puts it, perhaps
the federal government "should get off the federalism fence. 84 Either the
political and institutional dynamics are such that the states can be trusted to
establish and enforce strong academic standards or they cannot. And if they
cannot, then perhaps the federal government ought to just prescribe national
standards, as was supported by the first President Bush and by President
Clinton. 85 To be sure, perhaps political reality would stand in the way of
such standards-but that is not the new governance proponents' argument.
Their argument is that providing states flexibility is better as a policy matter
because of the uncertainty about ends and means.8 6
D. The Future of New Governance Scholarship
Going forward, the new governance scholarship would do well to focus
more on the conditions for success, as the best of the essays in this volume
do. Susan Sturm's work on gender equity, for example, highlights the role of
problem-solving intermediaries like the National Science Foundation, which
are trusted by all parties and build up institutional knowledge by learning
from experience. 87 One question this raises is whether administrative agencies themselves can be such problem-solving intermediaries.
Another question is whether the threat of either litigation or more topdown regulation is necessary to induce the regulated entities to engage in
collaborative efforts. Hervey's chapter on health care in the European
Union, for example, traces how a new governance scheme arose out of
private litigation 88-a context that isexplored in other work by Susan Sturm
on employment discrimination. Sturm shows how Home Depot settled class
actions in the United States alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination

82. Richard F. Elmore, Details, Details, Details, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 318
(2003).
83. See 20 U.S.C. § 631 l(b)(3) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (setting forth requirements that each
state implement academic assessments for students in mathematics, reading or language arts, and

science).
84. Ryan, supra note 78, at 987.
85. See id. at 988 (noting that both the first President Bush and President Clinton advocated
national standards).
86. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 1715, 1712-15 (arguing that providing states with a
framework within which they are free to question and experiment with means ultimately triggers a
"race to the top in educational performance" and facilitates redress for those schools and
populations that do not benefit initially from that race to improve).
87. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 337, 337-39 (describing the National Science Foundation's
role as a problem-solving intermediary).
88. Hervey, supra note 28, at 180-81.
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in part by implementing problem-solving mechanisms into the corporate
culture.89 It may well be that the success of new governance depends in part
on the old, hoary topic of the law of remedies.
New governance scholarship would also benefit from attention to the
differences in culture and governmental structure across countries. Though
in this volume the authors specified that their task was not "deliberately
comparative," 90 future work should also focus on the differences between the
European Union and the United States and discuss why new governance
schemes might work better in one and not the other.
Greater attention to the conditions for success, and the context in which
new governance schemes arise, will lead to more careful definition of the
regulatory problem. Recall Michael Dorf's definition: "[I]n the conditions of
modern life, people increasingly find that their problem is not so much an
inability to persuade those with different interests or viewpoints of what to
do; their problem is that no one has a complete solution to what collectively
ails them." 91 On this account, developed in this book by Simon's account of
Toyota jurisprudence, constant questioning and collaboration lead to better
solutions. 92 But the problem with Simon's analogy is that on the Toyota production floor, all the problem solvers are on the same team. When teachers'
unions, parents, and school districts are collaborating, the interests may not
be quite as harmonious.
Perhaps the most fruitful question going forward is how to capture other
kinds of regulatory methods. Think about new governance regulation as an
umbrella term covering a kind of interaction between the state, regulated
entities, and other stakeholders that has a number of desiderata-public
participation, data provision, transparency, benchmarking, sharing of best
practices, fora for deliberation on ends and means, and autonomy and flexibility for those subject to regulation.
The question for new governance proponents and policymakers is how
best to maximize the number of areas of regulation that contain these
features. To do so, we need to look more broadly and deeply at the political
economy of policymaking and implementation. In order to scale up, new
governance scholars and practitioners need to follow more of their own advice about breaking down, or analyzing across, the traditional boundaries of
policymaking and implementation.

89. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A StructuralApproach,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 512, 510-12 (2001) ("The solution was to achieve accountability through
technology, information systems, and systematizing discretion, rather than through rules."). But see
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failureof Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 487, 516-17 (2003) (arguing that this kind of "negotiated governance" model, that of a
compliance regime internal to organizations, has led to lawyer-driven inefficiencies).
90. De B6rca & Scott, supra note 18, at 1.
91. Dorf, supra note 12, at 1269.
92. See Simon, supra note 39, at 48-50.
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The new governance experiments to date in the United States fall
largely into two categories: (1) areas where centralized regulation is well established but controversial among those regulated and (2) attempts to solve
As to the former, environmental and
intractable social problems.
occupational-health-and-safety regulation are the two most prominent
examples. In these areas, businesses subject to regulation have substantial
complaints about the burdens of existing command-and-control regulation.
As they have had increased success in the public and other domains in pushing for deregulation, policymakers and others have searched for a middle
ground.9 3
The second category, what I refer to as intractable social problems, is
made up of problems that primarily concern individuals not well represented
in the political arena but that frequently garner public attention. These include drug abuse,94 education for the disadvantaged, 95 and even gender bias
in higher education.96
But these two categories leave out vast swaths of economic and other
activity that are, or might be, subject to some kind of regulation. Consider
the category of activities that are centered in one industry or a handful of
industries, but cause harm to the public, by looking at two examples of recent
vintage: data privacy and childhood obesity.
In data privacy, a series of well-publicized gaffes and identity thefts
from data brokers, like ChoicePoint, led to litigation, calls for regulation at
the state and federal levels, and other measures.9 7 With childhood obesity, it
was a report by the Institute of Medicine, a congressional advisory body, that
put the issue on the public agenda and led advocacy and public-health groups

93. See Freeman, supra note 10, at 97-98 (acknowledging that health-and-safety and
environmental regulation may be particularly promising areas for collaboration because "the
regulated industries in these sectors have accepted the inevitability of regulation and are willing to
discuss implementation").
94. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
ExperimentalistGovernment, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000) (discussing drug courts as a novel form
of govemance).
95. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 1737-41 (noting that Kentucky educationgovernance reforms created frameworks for grassroots organizations focused on identifying the
causes of achievement gaps among disadvantaged groups); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 68, at 238
(noting that Texas education accountability reforms had the goal of closing "the achievement gap
between property-rich and property-poor districts" (quoting Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno,
917 S.W.2d 717, 728-29 (Tex. 1995))).
96. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 17, at 325 ("Recently, a different public approach to the
problem has emerged to address women's marginalisation and under-participation in universities,
particularly in the sciences.").
97. See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal
Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 154-58 (2006) (describing data security breaches and the ensuing
state and federal legislative responses).
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to call for regulation of the food and beverage industry concerning sales and
marketing to children. 98
In both these circumstances, there was little to no regulation of the
relevant industry before the issue became one of public concern (no
regulation of data brokers on information privacy99 and no regulation of the
food and beverage industry on sales and marketing to children' 00 ). And the
problem here is not, contra the democratic experimentalists, that the relevant
stakeholders agree on the ultimate goal but are having trouble figuring out
how best to get there. The problem here is a fundamental conflict between
the interests of the companies that want to maximize profits and the public
that bears the burden of the externalities of these profit-making enterprises.
The issue for the public is how best to balance these interests and by what
means.
In both these circumstances-data privacy and childhood obesity-the
industries responded to the threat of litigation and government regulation
with a tactic I call preemptive self-regulation. In order to forestall the drive
toward government regulation, the industries simply announced and began to
implement regulation themselves. 10 1
For scholars and policymakers seeking an alternative to command-andcontrol regulation, chastened by experience, and recognizing the limits of
administrative agencies, this might seem like a good outcome. Indeed, much
of the new governance and related literature relies in part on a strategy of
relying on the regulated entities to do more themselves in light of government agencies' inherent0 3limits. 10 2 Even for some progressives, selfregulation holds promise.'

98. For an overview (though not an unbiased one), see Michele Simon, Can Food Companies
Be Trusted to Self-Regulate? An Analysis of Corporate Lobbying and Deception to Undermine
Children's Health, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 169 (2006) and Michele Simon, Food Marketing to
Children and the Law: An Introduction, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2006).
99. See Brian Deagon, High-Profile Online Data Thefts Irk Pols, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY,

Aug. 22, 2005, at A4 (describing a number of bills under consideration introduced in response to
data security breaches and predicting closer regulation of data brokers).
100. See Tracy Westen, Government Regulation of Food Marketing to Children: The Federal
Trade Commission and the Kid- Vid Controversy, 39 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 79 (tracing the development

and demise of several plans to regulate the marketing of food to children).
101. See Ellen J. Fried, Assessing Effectiveness of Self-Regulation: A Case Study of the

Children's Advertising Review Unit, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 93 (describing the inception of and
various changes to the Children's Advertising Review Unit as a self-regulating tool for the
advertising industry); Tom Zeller Jr., Investigators Fear Curbs on PersonalData, INT'L HERALD

TRIB., Mar. 22, 2005, at IR (relating the decision made by the Federal Trade Commission to permit
a working group made up of database companies to establish self-regulating guidelines in lieu of
federal regulation).
102. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,

551-56 (2000) (describing the pervasive role of private entities in regulation, service provision,
policy design, and implementation); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2037-40 (2005) (discussing the role of private-governance scholarship in
developing a more robust view of the role of private entities in regulation); Symposium, New Forms
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But new governance scholars ought to have a story for policymakers
and a strategy for how to turn these attempts at preemptive self-regulation
into the kind of new governance schemes that will produce positive policy
outcomes on the underlying issues. For data privacy, an industry group
might be tasked with coordinating and publicizing best practices on how
companies can protect data privacy. For childhood obesity, the Institute of
Medicine could produce periodic company-by-company reports on the marketing of soda and high-sugar foods to kids. In a world of regulatory
pluralism, where different modes of regulation are best in different contexts,
trying to maximize the number of desirable features (transparency,
benchmarking, etc.) of any regime may be the best that a regulatory theory
can do.
III. The Regulatory and Administrative State
A. Public Law in Legal Education
Since the rise of the administrative state in the United States, legal
education has struggled to incorporate "public law" courses into its
curriculum. The first courses to appear were administrative law courses,
dealing with the process by which agencies do rulemaking, judicial review,
and other related topics. Shortly thereafter, legislation courses grew,
introducing students to the legislative process and how to read and interpret
statutes.10 4 After World War II, two professors at Harvard, Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks, developed what grew to be legendary materials called The
Legal Process.10 5 These materials introduced students to the different ways
that society can deal with public problems, including regulation through administrative agencies.
The administrative law and legislation courses have remained staples of
the upper-level curriculum, and though the "Legal Process" was taught in
dozens of law schools in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, it is now taught in
only a handful. In the meantime, many law schools have moved toward re10 6
quiring some kind of public law course as part of the first-year curriculum.
Though some schools did this through an administrative law or legislation
course, others, such as Columbia and Georgetown, developed a "regulatory
of Governance: Ceding Public Power to PrivateActors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002) (reviewing
broadly the various ways in which private actors have entered the public sphere).
103. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005) (viewing the rise in self-regulation as an opportunity to
improve employee rights through the use of independent monitors).
104. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and CriticalIntroduction
to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC

PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at lxix-lxx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
105. See HART & SACKS, supra note 104.
106. Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year Curriculum, 58 J. LEGAL
EDUC. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 3 n.9, on file with author).
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state" course that focused in large part on questions of institutional or regulatory design.'0 7 With Harvard's recent adoption of a Legislation and
Regulation course into the required first-year curriculum and Vanderbilt's
dean and a leading regulatory-state scholar, Edward Rubin, leading
curricular-reform efforts both at his own school and through the AALS, the
issue has come to the fore again. 0 8
B. Heinzerling and Tushnet's Approach
1. The Book's Strategy.-Into the mix step Harvard's Mark Tushnet
and Georgetown's Lisa Heinzerling with their new book, The Regulatory and
Administrative State. This is a new casebook designed to fill the void in the
market-where demand may also grow if other schools follow Harvard's
lead and require such a course-for materials to teach an introductory course
in public law. On the question of whether such a course should be required,
Tushnet and Heinzerling are clear in the Preface: "Lawyers in the twentyfirst century need course materials of this sort. They are deeply involved in
public law and the regulatory state, and need the skills-including the ability
to read and understand statutes-associated with the modem regulatory
state." 0 9 At this stage, the question of whether law students need the
"skills... associated with the modem regulatory state" is not controversial.
The issue is whether or not this book provides them.
The book takes as its theme the regulation of risks to human life and
health. In exploring how the law regulates these areas, the book considers
recurring issues of institutional choice, statutory interpretation, and market
and regulatory failure. And it is quite different from a standard administrative law or legislation book.
The book proceeds in four parts.
First, it considers the basic
justifications for regulation in circumstances where the individual parties
contract. Second, it explores the contours of common law regulation of risks
to human life and health through both criminal and tort law. Third, the book
takes up the emergence of the modem regulatory state as a response to the
perceived failure of common law regulation of risk. In doing so, it offers an
introduction to statutory interpretation, administrative law, and public-choice
theory. Finally, the book closes with a section on "new perspectives" on the
regulatory and administrative state in the twenty-first century, exploring

107. Tushnet taught the course at Georgetown for many years before his recent move to
Harvard, and The Regulatory and Administrative State book is an outgrowth of the materials he
used to teach that course. In turn, such a course was the descendant of the Law in Society course
that the Wisconsin legal historian Willard Hurst developed in the 1930s and 1940s with Wisconsin's
then-dean Lloyd Garrison. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 104, at lxx-lxxiii.
108. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
109. HEINZERLING & TustHNET, supra note 4, at x.
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some of the 0same issues explored in greater depth in Law and New
Governance.11
The book starts in Chapter 1 with the limits of private ordering-more
precisely, the problem of "justifying regulation when parties have a contract
with each other""'-by introducing occupational health risks, and the traditional constitutional and common law legal response that such risks were
accounted for in the contract between employer and employee.112 Then in
Chapter 2, the authors present an economic perspective suggesting both that
legal rules should provide appropriate incentives for future conduct and that
occupational health risks should be factored into the "wage premium" in the
Chapter 3 introduces
contract between employer and employee.'13
"alternative perspectives" that might bear on the regulation of workplace
health and safety, specifically the ideas that certain aspects of personhood
ought to be "inalienable" in the marketplace, that unequal bargaining power
might mean that the acceptance of risk in the workplace is not truly
voluntary, and that distributive and paternalistic considerations can trump
"freedom of contract."' 14
In Part II, the authors explore the doctrinal and institutional limits of the
common law. Having already explored some of the limits of contract law in
regulating risk, Chapter 4 looks at criminal and tort law. This is perhaps the
most interesting chapter in the book and has moments of pedagogical
brilliance. The authors start with the statutory definitions of murder in
California and Pennsylvania and then reproduce a 1973 memo by a General
Motors engineer that became well known in auto-accident litigation for its
cost-benefit analysis of designing safer gas tanks." 15 Through the
"comments and questions," the authors show how the necessary criminal
intent for murder does not quite fit the paradigm of businesses doing costbenefit analyses about product design. 1 6 Moreover, in the notes, the authors
put the students in the position of lawyers advising their clients and ask what
possible courses of action they would counsel. 1 7 Then the authors turn to
the limits of tort law in regulating risk, looking at a toxic-tort case in New
Jersey and an attempt to use statistical evidence to prove causation in an
auto-accident case. 18 These cases nicely illustrate the limits of courts'
capacity to determine and compensate for exposure to risk.

110. Although the authors call it a casebook, excerpts from cases are equaled if not
outnumbered by excerpts from scholarly articles.
111. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at x.
112. See id. at 3-36.
113. Seeid. at 37-52.
114. See id. at 53-108.
115. Seeid.at 111-13.
116. See id. at 113-14.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 128-55.

HeinOnline -- 86 Tex. L. Rev. 839 2007-2008

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 86:819

Chapter 5, "Institutional Strengths and Limits,"' 1 9 then turns squarely to
a theme that will recur throughout the rest of the book-that of comparative
institutional analysis, or institutional competence. The authors present excerpts from two law-review articles that nicely introduce many of the
considerations relevant to deciding among courts (adjudicating under tort or
criminal law), administrative agencies (promulgating rules under a statutory
framework), and the market in terms of which best regulates risk. 2 ° They
also excerpt materials on the sociology of claiming legal rights, 2 explaining
that the "naming, blaming, claiming" of how disputes do or do not enter the
legal system affects how any particular scheme of risk regulation will work,
and is a welcome "law
in action" addition to thinking about comparative in122
stitutional analysis.
In guiding students' reflections on such matters, the authors put the
students, implicitly, in the role of policymakers, asking questions like "what
is the best institution to use in responding to" work-related carpal tunnel
syndrome, climate change, and other issues? 23 As I explain further below,
this perspective of the policymaker, or what the authors refer to later in the
book as the disinterested social scientist, 124 is the primary perspective from
which the authors approach these materials.
More promising, in my view, are the too-rare instances where students
are asked to think about the role of lawyers. In this chapter, for example,
students are asked to think about how lawyers affect the process by which
individuals complain about workplace sexual harassment or secondhand
smoke-even here, though, the students are asked to play social scientists
25
thinking about the role of lawyers, not thinking as lawyers themselves. 1
As Tushnet's former Wisconsin colleague, the late Willard Hurst, did in
his Law in Society course designed in the late 1930s,126 the authors in
Chapter 6 use the tale of workers' compensation to show how a statutory
framework for regulating risk emerged from dissatisfaction on all sides with
the common law.127 They provide excerpts from articles exploring the concept of "moral hazard" used by economists to indicate a possible downside
for workers' compensation schemes-workers, knowing that they will be
compensated for injury, do not have sufficient incentive to take care to

119. Id. at 205.
120. See id. at 205-31.
121. Id. at 231-45.
122. Id. at 231-39 (excerpting William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ....15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631 (19801981)).
123. Id. at231.
124. Id. at 683.
125. See id. at 239-40.
126. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 104, at lxxi.
127. See id. at 275-95.
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prevent such injuries.128 And they also include articles to point out some of
the limits of workers' compensation, particularly in the area of occupational
disease. 129
Part IlI, "The Modem Regulatory State,"'' 30 is the core of the book,
introducing students to statutory interpretation, the basics of administrative
law, and some modem features of contemporary regulation including costbenefit analysis and information provision. The authors provide a solid introduction to the key administrative law topics of rulemaking, judicial
review, standard setting, and nondelegation, primarily through the principal
Supreme Court cases and a few circuit opinions applying those cases., 31 To
be sure, future lawyers in a regulatory practice would have to take the full
administrative law course, but others could be confident that they have a decent foundation. And the authors present interesting materials on regulatory
design: cost-benefit analysis; some of the ways that regulatory efforts fail;
and how providing information can be a market-based solution to regulating
that also has its limits, as psychological research presented here
risk, but one
32
indicates. 1

But the materials on statutory interpretation are inadequate, covering
only one chapter and arguably not even that. This is a serious flaw. The
materials on statutory interpretation consist of excerpts from a few classic
articles-by Karl Llewellyn, Frank Easterbrook, and Stephen Breyer-to
provide an excellent introduction to the overall approach in interpreting
statutes.133 These articles are followed by two cases: one, the classic Holy
Trinity'34 case, demonstrates the conflict between statutory purpose and text;
the second, a Seventh Circuit opinion interpreting the Sentencing
Guidelines, 135 features interesting, dueling opinions from Judges Posner and
Easterbrook. 136 After that, the authors go right to Chevron, 37 the classic
of
Supreme Court case about judicial deference to agency interpretation
38
statutes, and a more recent case on that topic, Brown and Williamson.'
The canons of statutory interpretation barely appear. Other than a table
from the Llewelyn excerpt listing the statutory canons and the responses to
128. See HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 295-306.
129. See id. at 306-15.
130. Id. at317.
131. See id.at 415-60,613-82.
132. See id. at 461-611.
133. See id. at 319-49.
134. Church of the Holy Trinity v.United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
135. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S.453 (1991).
136. See HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 350-77 (excerpting Holy Trinity and
Marshall).
137. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
138. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); see HEINZERLING &
TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 378-412 (providing text and discussion of Chevron and Brown &
Williamson).
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each,13 9 there is no exploration of how those canons are used. Perhaps the
authors are fully persuaded by the idea that Llewellyn introduced in his classic article that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point., 140 As
a result, the authors ask in comments and questions section: "Given the
availability of competing canons of interpretation, what use are they?"'14 1 But
Llewellyn also said unambiguously about the canons: "Every lawyer must be
familiar with them all: they are still needed tools of argument."'' 42 Either the
authors disagree, or they have unwisely chosen to put the canons beyond the
scope of the book.
At the close of Part III, the authors take a welcome turn from the
perspective of a "disinterested social scientist" to the perspective of
"politicians., 143 In Chapter 13, they introduce public-choice theory,
the
microeconomic approach that looks at the self-interested incentives that
politicians have in making regulatory choices. 44 Politicians want to run for
reelection, they need to raise money for such a campaign, and their choices
are shaped by these realities. 145 Besides the excerpts from public-choice
theory, the authors include an interesting excerpt from the Harvard political
theorist Jane Mansbridge questioning the premises of public-choice theory
with its focus on self-interestedness, its acceptance of adversary democracy,
and the absence of "deliberation" from this view of public life. 146 No doubt
the new governance scholars would agree with these objections to publicchoice theory. But all must face the question of how exactly to get past the
reality of "adversary democracy" and toward the aspiration of greater deliberation in public life, a theme I will return to below.
In ending Part III's tour of the modem regulatory state, the authors
present a view of "[s]etting [r]egulatory [p]riorities" by looking at worker
safety. 47 An article by the sociologist Andrew Szasz provides an excellent
look at the context surrounding passage of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, including the mine disaster and the resulting publicity and hearings that pushed through passage of the law.' 48 The article also recounts the
strategic options facing industry on implementation-how closely to work

139. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 325-27 (excerpting Karl Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed,3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950)).
140. Id.at 324 (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 139, at 401).
141. Id. at 327.
142. Id. (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 139, at 401).
143. Id.at 683.
144. See id.at 683-705.
145. See id. at 683.
146. See id at 721, 716-22 (excerpting and quoting Jane Mansbridge, Self-interest in Political
Life, 18 POL. THEORY 132 (1990)).
147. Id. at 723, 723-50.
148. See id. at 723-35 (excerpting Andrew Szasz, Industrial Resistance to OccupationalSafety
and Health Legislation: 1971-1981, 32 SOC. PROBS. 103 (1984)).
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149
with the new agency, OSHA, and how much to try to undermine the law.
The section would benefit from asking students to reflect upon how they
would approach these options as lawyers representing businesses, but the
basic approach of looking at the context in which regulatory schemes arise
and are implemented is not only valuable here but is also one from which the
Law and New Governance volume could benefit.
Heinzerling and Tushnet close the book with a two-chapter part called
"The Regulatory and Administrative State in the Twenty-First Century: New
Perspectives."' 50 The part consists of a chapter on comparative perspectives
on the problem of regulating risk, focusing primarily on studies of environmental regulation in Great Britain and Japan. 1 ' And the final chapter,
"Proposals for Reform," has a significant emphasis on the new-governance152
style mechanisms described in de Btirca and Scott's collection.

2. Success on Its Own Terms?-This book is ambitious. On the theory
that students will learn more by "seeing the subjects in a unified course,"
Heinzerling and Tushnet designed the book as an introduction to "the reasons
for regulation, the ways in which regulation can go awry, the choice of legal
institutions for regulation, the choice of regulatory instruments, and the theory and practice of statutory interpretation."' 53 But in attempting to do so
much, the authors risk accomplishing relatively little. The authors believe
that today's lawyers need to have "both an understanding of154
statutory interpretation and an understanding of the reasons for regulation."'
But it is not clear why exactly they need the latter. To be sure, when
Willard Hurst first designed such a course at Wisconsin in the 1940s, the
place of the administrative state itself was much more tenuous. 155 In that
context, a course that spent some time demonstrating the limits of the
common law or the need for scientific expertise as part of the Executive
Branch might have made sense. But today, the administrative state is an inescapable part of our legal system. No one is suggesting that it is
unnecessary in our complex modern society.
And so, with choices to make about what precisely law students need in
perhaps the only course they will take on the regulatory state, I am not sure
that a few chapters carefully, and even compellingly, teasing out the very
reason for its existence is the best use of scarce resources. In focusing so
heavily on the reasons for regulation and the choice of regulatory
149. Id. at 728-35.
150. Id. at 751.
151. See id. at 753-91.
152. See id. at 793, 793-822.
153. Id. at ix.
154. Id. at x.
155. See Daniel R. Ernst, Willard Hurst and the Administrative State: From Williams to
Wisconsin, 18 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 34 (2000) (noting Hurst's concern that the complex problems
facing modernity required a new "use [of] law in all its forms to address the needs of society").

HeinOnline -- 86 Tex. L. Rev. 843 2007-2008

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 86:819

instruments, the authors have designed a book ideal for a third-year elective
in law school or a required course at a public-policy school, but less than
ideal for a required course in law school.156
To be sure, a few unnecessary chapters might not be the worst sin
committed by casebook authors, or a particularly uncommon one. And
Heinzerling and Tushnet have designed the book intentionally for professors
who want to use this book's basic "spine" for a course that focuses on substantive issues other than those of risk regulation that constitute the "ribs" of
this particular book and course.157
But the focus on the reasons for regulation means that the spine itself is
not strong enough. Of the five topics that Heinzerling and Tushnet aim to
cover in the book-"rationales for regulation, choices among institutions,
choices of regulatory instruments, regulatory failures, and statutory
interpretation"' 158-- the last one is the most important for lawyers to learn and
learn well, but it is the weakest in the book. After all, many lawyers will not
have the kind of practice that involves proceedings before the Federal
Communications Commission, for example, but all will have to deal with
statutes, even in practices that are purely transactional or heavily focused on
private law or commercial litigation.
What is needed is more of an approach that focuses on training future
lawyers to make arguments about how to interpret statutes. Put simply,
depending on the client and the situation, a lawyer will have to argue either
that a client or his conduct is or is not covered by a statutory provision-and
future lawyers need to be trained to make these kinds of arguments the same
way they are trained to make doctrinal arguments. To make matters worse,
most legislation courses do not focus on teaching this skill either. The leading textbook for legislation courses, for example, authored by prominent
scholars on statutory interpretation, 159 underemphasizes the goal of providing
future lawyers
a "toolkit" of statutory arguments to use on behalf of
0
clients.16

156. For a thoughtful discussion of this "second-generation" question of what a required public
law course ought to cover, including a similar critique of the Tushnet and Heinzerling approach, see
Leib, supra note 106 (manuscript at 18-19). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Three Ages of
Legislation Pedagogy, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 7-9 (2003) for a discussion of several
different approaches.
157. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at ix-x.

158. Id. at ix.
159. WILLIAM M. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRET-r, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (3d ed. 2001).

160. A better approach, which emphasizes the craft of making statutory arguments, while
containing enough theory to ground the students in why exactly they are making these kinds of
arguments, is contained in an excellent new book, LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK,
MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES

(2006).
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C. The Lost PedagogicalLegacy of Hart and Sacks
For generations, students at Harvard Law School and elsewhere learned
about the contours of the regulatory state through Hart and Sacks's The Legal
Process.161 In the wake of criticism from the "crits" on the left and publicchoice economists on the right, the approach embodied in The Legal Process
has been largely discredited in the academy.162 Unfortunately, its discrediting as a scholarly approach has led to the loss of the pedagogical approach
embodied in the materials as well. Here, I argue that a book like Heinzerling
and Tushnet's would benefit from reclaiming this lost pedagogical legacy.
Where Heinzerling and Tushnet begin the book with the problem of
justifying regulation when parties have a contract with each other, 163 Hart
and Sacks begin with a much more mundane, and literally messy, problem:
the problem of spoiled cantaloupes. 164 In this problem, famous to generations of Legal Process students at Harvard and elsewhere, students are put
into the position of counseling a man who received a shipment of spoiled
cantaloupes and asked to consider: What are the client's options? 165 And
Hart and Sacks provide the relevant regulatory and other background to allow for thoughtful discussion and consideration of those options. Though
more mundane, this problem is more pedagogically useful because it places
students in the role of lawyers. And this placing students into "role" has
been emphasized by scholars of legal education,
most recently in the
66
Carnegie Foundation's EducatingLawyers.'
So when Heinzerling and Tushnet discuss questions of institutional
competence, they ask which institution is "best" for regulating different kinds
of risk, with best being defined by a disinterested social scientist or
policymaker. 167 But as the authors indicate in their public-choice chapter, no
policymakers are disinterested, at least not the ones who want to be
reelected.168 And certainly no lawyers are. This is a flaw that both books
share-the new governance scholars devote a fair amount of attention to
undermining the traditional principal-agent relationship where legislators
hand down rules for agencies to interpret, but they ignore entirely another
critical principal-agent relationship, that of clients and lawyers. In other

161. HART & SACKS, supra note 104.
162. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 104, at li,
cxix-cxx (citing general critiques from law
professors arguing that the theory embodied in The Legal Process rested upon an inadequate theory
of democracy and a flawed theory of adjudication).
163. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 1.
164. HART & SACKS, supra note 104, at 10-12.
165. Id. at 11-12.
166. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 22 (2007).
167. See, e.g., HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 231 (asking which institution, given
a particular framework, is best to use in responding to a variety of social issues).
168. See id. at 683 ("[T]he premise [of public-choice theory] is that the kind of self-interested
behavior one sees in markets can also be seen in the political realm.").
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words, lawyers are heavily involved in shaping these institutional choices on
behalf of clients. And future lawyers ought to engage in guided reflection on
how they might go about doing so.
Rather than asking what is the "best" institution to deal with workrelated carpal tunnel syndrome, for example, one might more fruitfully ask:
What if you were a lawyer for a union and started to receive a number of
complaints from employees about such injuries? Would you bring a productliability lawsuit against the maker of the machine causing such injuries?
Would you bring it to the attention of OSHA even though there was no specific standard covering such injuries? Would you support the development
of a federal ergonomics standard that mandates rest breaks at specified intervals for certain jobs, for example, or support simply mandating employers to
come up with a plan for minimizing such injuries? Would you try to get
measures to help prevent such injuries into the next collective-bargaining
agreement?
In order to have informed reflections on such issues, of course, students
169
would need to be provided with background on all these possibilities.
Such an exercise starts to look a lot like the one Hart and Sacks led generations of students through in the case of the spoiled cantaloupes. Indeed, a
key pedagogical innovation of Hart and Sacks's materials was their use of
the "problem method" as a vehicle for introducing students to the issues of
public and private ordering at the heart of the materials. 170 As Hart once put
it in a letter:
[K]nowledge consists, not in doctrine, not in propositional statements
stored away in the brain; but in the capacity to solve problems as they
are actually presented in life; the capacity to see all the
implications ... of the action to be taken; the capacity to bring to bear
of decisions the maximum of the available experience of
in the taking
17
mankind. 1
Students should take a course on the regulatory state, but on lawyering,
not policymaking. Such a course might ask students to play the role of the
lawyer for a teachers' union, school district, or state or federal department of
education; provide them with the statute and the accompanying regulations;
and ask them to make arguments supporting their client's position. Such a

169. This kind of approach, akin to the business-school case method, is proposed by two
professors who spent considerable time thinking about legal education as part of Harvard's recent
curricular-reform effort. See Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Casefor Another Case Method,
60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 604, 603-05 (2007) ("[Wje are members of a committee that is presently
recommending to our faculty a set of curricular revisions that include[s] the creation of problemsolving materials of this sort .... ").
170. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 104, at lxxv (discussing a precursor to Hart and
Sacks's materials).
171. Id. at lxxvi (quoting an October 15, 1941 letter from Henry M. Hart, Jr. to John H.
Williams, who was then Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard
University).
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course might ask students to consider how they might propose changing the
law-as advocates for a particular client-in the context of, for example, the
current reauthorization debate on NCLB.
To be sure, the line between lawyering and policymaking is not always
so clear, and indeed, students should be trained in both evaluating the effects
of and advocating for particular policies. But the perspective ought to be that
of a lawyer with a client, not that of a disinterested regulator or social
scientist.
Note that this is a different critique than the familiar one that legal
education is not practical enough. Heinzerling and Tushnet are trying to be
quite practical, aiming to provide with these materials what students need:
"the skills-including the ability to read and understand statutes-associated
with the modern regulatory state."172 But they do not deliver the goods.
In closing the book with a chapter on new governance mechanisms,
Heinzerling and Tushnet ask a series of questions aimed at new governance's
potential: "Can you identify the political conditions that make such uses
possible? What are the political constraints on, and possibilities for, adopting
reconstitutive regulation more broadly?"'' 73 And after an excerpt on
"reflexive environmental law," the authors ask whether such a system would
"soften the system of adversarial legalism."' 174 They ask the right questions.
I begin to address them below in Part IV.
IV. Adversarial Legalism and Lawyers
A. Accountingfor AdversarialLegalism
What will the American regulatory state look like in twenty years? To a
certain extent, both books are making wagers on that answer. In this section,
I argue that how each book deals with that question has an impact on the
other and could help shape the very answer itself. The argument goes like
this: a key and largely unexplored variable in the scalability of new
governance in the United States is our culture of adversarial legalism, to use
Robert Kagan's term.175 In not grappling with that issue, the new governance
literature currently falls short.
But our adversarial legal culture is not fixed, and one explanatory factor
here is how we train tomorrow's lawyers. Here, Heinzerling and Tushnet
miss an opportunity. To be sure, they do not ask students to play the role of
warrior litigators, but nor do they ask them to play the role of problemsolving collaborators. 176 In failing to do so, they fail to maximize the
172. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at x.
173. Id. at 822.
174. Id. at 804.
175. KAGAN, supra note 9, at 3.
176. See generally Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting
Conversations About Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
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chances that tomorrow's lawyers will act to change the adversarial legal culture in which they operate.
The political scientist Robert Kagan has had significant influence on the
way we think about law in the United States with his research on adversarial
legalism, which he views as a distinctively American phenomenon consisting
of "policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means of
lawyer-dominated litigation., 1 77 Kagan separates adversarial legalism into
two principal components: "formal legal contestation"-that is, the frequent
invocation of legal rights, duties, and procedural requirements in the course
of policymaking and policy implementation-and "litigant activism"--a
style of lawyering where the disputing parties dominate the assertion of
claims and legal arguments, the gathering of evidence, and the selection of
judge
or administrative offiwitnesses, unlike the model in Europe where the 17
8
proceeding.
the
shaping
in
role
larger
a
cial plays
Kagan's work relies heavily on cross-national studies that demonstrate
that regulation in the United States is more adversarial and legalistic than that
79
of other industrialized democracies, notably those of Europe and Japan.1
Though some scholars have questioned Kagan's normative assumptions (e.g.,
Is adversarial legalism necessarily bad?),180 his basic descriptive point remains largely unchallenged. For our purposes, then, Kagan's work raises a
serious challenge to new governance scholarship, with its vision of collaboration and inclusive participation. The question is: Why do new governance
scholars think that interests accustomed to battling over policy will put down
their swords, share information, and collaborate?
Put differently, how can new governance schemes overcome the
adversarial legal culture in the United States? Perhaps the reason why new
governance is much more widespread in the European Union, and may remain that way, is because of this lack of adversarial legal culture. But this
variable is largely unexplored in the new governance literature thus far.
In his classic book on the topic, Adversarial Legalism: The American
Way of Law, Kagan concludes by questioning whether the United States can
move beyond adversarial legalism.' 81 He posits that in order to do so,
Americans need to be willing to accept giving administrative officials more
discretion, and accord their decisions more finality, without the opportunity
for legal challenge. 82 This is consistent with the European model, but Kagan
POL'Y 119 (1997) (discussing a paradigm shift from a "gladiator" model of lawyering to a
"problem-solver" model of lawyering).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 9.
179. Id. at 53.
180. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REv. 189 (2003) (reviewing
KAGAN, supra note 9).
181. KAGAN, supra note 9, at 242-52.
182. Id. at 239-41; see also Freeman, supra note 10, at 96 (arguing that greater deference to
agency discretion may be required at a minimum under the model of collaborative governance).

HeinOnline -- 86 Tex. L. Rev. 848 2007-2008

2008]

Law and Governance in the 21 st Century Regulatory State

is skeptical that Americans will go for it.' 83 Indeed, the experience in
administrative law of the last few decades with "negotiated rulemaking,"
which might be described as new governance, offers weak support for the
possibility of getting beyond adversarial legalism. As Cary Coglianese and
other scholars have shown, the rules have been challenged nearly as much
under negotiated rulemaking as with traditional rulemaking.184 Strangely, the
new governance scholars appear to ignore this literature.
In order for new governance to succeed, perhaps it will be necessary to
amend the Administrative Procedure Act to limit judicial review
85 Will lawyers accept this? Regulated entities? Citizens?
considerably. 86
Should they?'
Indeed, the adversarial legal culture may carry over to new governance
schemes.
To take one example, Kagan cites the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act 187 as an example of a law that relies on due
process rights and private lawsuits for enforcement, as opposed to an88
administrative-enforcement mechanism that would not rely on the courts.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the same lawyers who challenged the
schools on special-education issues have also started bringing legal challenges under NCLB.1 89 Moreover, parents and their lawyers are starting to
use the NCLB "right" to transfer students out of low-performing schools to
challenge school rezoning decisions. 90 This is not to say that these developments are necessarily bad, just that the shift from a rights-based, court-centric
model to a problem-solving, collaborative one seems tentative at best.

183. KAGAN, supra note 9, at 242-43.
184. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performanceof Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1308, 1308-10 (1997) ("In the aggregate, negotiated rulemaking
has not generated any substantial difference in the way that legal challenges get resolved.").
185. Kagan appears to think so. See Robert A. Kagan, Political and Legal Obstacles to
Collaborative Ecosystem Planning, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871, 875, 874-75 (1997) (arguing that
increasing use of collaborative ecosystem planning would be "aided immensely" by changes in
statutes allowing parties to have access to the courts to challenge such plans); see also Frank B.
Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV.
1013, 1053 (2000) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking has been frustrated by the adversarial
legalism that the APA's allowance for judicial review promotes).
186. For an argument that they all should, see Frank B. Cross, Shattering the FragileCasefor
JudicialReview of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1314-26 (1999), which argues that judicial
review of administrative rulemaking allows interested parties to use litigation to change rules to
their own benefit.
187. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 1401, 89 Stat. 773, 775 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 (Supp. V 2005)).
188. Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism?: A PreliminaryInquiry, 19
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 18 (1994).
189. See Interview with Beth F. Morris, Attorney, Harben & Hartley, in Gainesville, Ga. (Aug.
31, 2007) (phone interview conducted by author).
190. See Sam Dillon, Alabama School Rezoning Plan Brings Out Cry of Resegregation, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at A I (describing the efforts of black Tuscaloosa parents to prevent students
from being transferred to lower performing schools).
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Alternatively, maybe it does not matter to the success of the new
governance project if affected parties still have the opportunity to challenge
regulations once formulated. But this would seem an odd conclusion since
continued opportunity for challenge would reduce the incentive to actually
participate and collaborate in the policymaking process. If the claim, then, is
that the collaborative process itself will lead to less adversarial positioning
for strategic advantage, that requires some empirical support, particularly in
light of the evidence to the contrary with respect to negotiated rulemaking. 19'
Lawyers will also need to be reassured that it is in their economic
interest to support (or at least not oppose) new governance. That is, if
lawyers for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, cannot make
money challenging agency regulations, they need to believe that they will be
able to make as much money participating in shaping the regulations and revising them in light of experience, or else lawyers' self-interest may help
prop up the status quo.
The scholars in Law and New Governance largely position themselves
as social engineers-technocrats deciding the optimal government programs.
But if the new governance scholars are going to succeed in understanding the
circumstances in which such schemes will work, they must take greater account of how the schemes arise and are implemented. Specifically, they
must account for the United States' culture of adversarial legalism, where
interests represented by lawyers clash, and lawyers use and attempt to shape
the law to serve their clients' interests. For better or worse, these lawyers are
generally not trying to work with others to reach the "best" social outcomewhether it be lower drug use, higher test scores in schools, or safer
workplaces. Rather, they are trying to advance their clients' interests in
particular contexts.
The Regulatory and Administrative State generally takes the same
technocratic perspective, that of a "disinterested social scientist, attempting
to determine what choices among institutions would best serve the public
interest."'' 92 Focusing on the general topic of risk regulation, the book asks
the questions: When is government regulation necessary and desirable, and
what form can and should regulation take? These are important and interesting topics, but a lack of attention to adversarial legalism means that this
book falls short.
Tushnet and Heinzerling's failure to attend more closely to the role of
lawyers and adversarial legalism is not just a pedagogical failure, then, it is a
scholarly one as well. If the relative success of the regulatory instruments
depends in part on the role that lawyers play and the degree to which adversarial legalism can "gum up the works," so to speak, then comparative
191. Tushnet speculates that the theory here is to "undermine the existing interest-group
structure" and then "reconstitute it in a different form" that will be less obstructionist to change and
new forms of governance. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 391.
192. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 683.
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institutional analysis that fails to look at these issues is incomplete and
inaccurate.
The example of NCLB helps illustrate this common weakness. With its
accountability measures, the law was an example for the new governance
scholars of the promise of democratic experimentalism (if properly
implemented). 193 But only by examining how such a law has and could play
out "on the ground" can one begin to understand the circumstances under
which such a model of regulation can work and, where it fails, how it can be
improved. And the way it will be implemented is not by everyone holding
hands and working together for the public interest. It is through a complex
pushing and pulling, with lawyers for teachers' unions, school districts, and
government agencies battling over what constitutes compliance with the law.
Only by examining this new governance innovation in the context of this adversarial legal system can it be properly evaluated.
Or return to the account of preemptive self-regulation on issues like data
privacy and childhood obesity. Without a strategy whereby new governance
encompasses such areas, it is difficult to see how it would become an overarching regulatory theory. Such areas are governed by a third kind of
adversarial legalism that Anthony Sebok recently highlighted: institutional
interests locked in permanent battle over the degree and kind of regulation in
a particular domain.194 He used it to describe the battle between the insurance industry and doctors, on the one hand, and trial lawyers and Naderites,
on the other, over the tort system.195 But the same could apply to the
teachers' unions, parents, and school districts in education policy, or other
interests in any number of domains.
In his contribution to Law and New Governance, Tushnet frames the
issue nicely: "What are the political circumstances under which some
innovations become significant in shaping large-scale policy?"' 96 He answers the question by looking to the "large-scale structures of national
governance," what he calls the "functional constitution."' 97 But as he has
pointed out in other work, the political circumstances are not fixed: indeed,
conservative constitutionalists had success by connecting with groups that
had political interests in their success, such as business interests.' 98 Only by
identifying such interests, and working with them to build political support
for experimentalist strategies, can new governance achieve a broader scale.

193. Liebman and Sabel describe how NCLB "is informed by an innovative system of publicly
monitored decentralization of school governance," known as the "New Accountability," see
Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 1708, in which "ends are revised in light of means and vice
versa," id. at 1713.
194. See Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatchesfrom the Tort Wars, 85 TExAS L. REV. 1465 (2007)
(book review).
195. Id. at 1474-75, 1506.
196. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 381.
197. Id.
198. Tushnet, supra note 58, at 360.
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B. Training Lawyers
If new governance is as transformative as its most ardent proponents
think, de Bdirca and Scott posit, this will demand a "re-conceptualisation of
our understanding of law and of the role of lawyers."1 99 Already, the new
governance scholars have certainly made the case that such regulation is now
part of the "modern regulator's toolkit., 200 But the twenty-first-century regulatory state in Heinzerling and Tushnet still looks a lot like the twentiethcentury version in Hart and Sacks.
Rather than introduce new governance methods at the end of the book in
an "alternatives" section, Heinzerling and Tushnet in future editions might
highlight such methods in Part III, when they talk about different regulatory
instruments. Perhaps if lawyers are trained in new governance as a mode of
regulation, they might be more inclined to propose such methods on behalf of
clients or government agencies.
Moreover, the causal arrow may run in both directions-that is, just as
new governance may lead us to rethink the role of lawyers and therefore how
we train them, a shift in how we train lawyers may help create an environment where new governance is more likely to succeed.
Kagan provocatively asks in the title of one article: "Do Lawyers Cause
Adversarial Legalism? ' 20 1 And he provides the tentative answer of
(essentially): To a certain extent, yes.20 2 If that is the case and how we train
lawyers is part of what leads to adversarial legalism, as Kagan argues, then
we may need to rethink legal education if we want to increase new
governance.20 3 To be sure, changing the way we train lawyers is simply one
piece of the puzzle, and perhaps a minor one relative to decentralized
government, distrust of government power, and other factors. But it is a
factor.
The good news is that there are signs of change in legal education,
consistent with the direction I describe here. Stanford, for example, is
offering courses in the second and third year that have students work collabo-

199. De Btirca & Scott, supra note 18, at 9; see also Dorf& Sabel, supra note 94, at 860-65
(arguing that experimentalism may lead to a reconception of the very notion of what it means to be
a professional such as a lawyer); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and InstitutionalDesign, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 928-29 (2003) (observing that Hart and Sacks's approach hinted at a new
model of legal professionalism where lawyers' principal skill is the "ability to collaborate across
disciplinary boundaries to solve problems").
200. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 547.

201. Kagan, supra note 188, tit.
202. See id. at 2 ("[W]hile adversarial legalism stems primarily from enduring features of
American political culture and governmental structure, the legal profession itself does play a
significant independent role in promoting and perpetuating adversarial legal contestation as a
prominent feature of governance.").
203. See id. at 24-27; see also Sturm, supra note 176, at 128 ("Legal education plays a pivotal
role in socializing lawyers to the primacy of the gladiator model [of lawyering].").
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ratively in interdisciplinary groups. 20 4 Harvard's new Problems and Theories
class also appears to be a step in this direction.2 °5 Law firms are indicating
they want graduates to have more problem-solving skills, and this may impact law-school curricula.2 °6
The theme of the Association of American Law Schools' 2008 Annual
Meeting was "Reassessing Our Roles as Scholars and Educators in Light of
Change," and the description of the main plenary session, "Rethinking Legal
Education for the 21 st Century," begins:
There is a growing sense among legal educators that it is time to rethink legal education. Dissatisfaction with the Langdellian model,
now over a century old, has combined with enthusiasm about new
approaches to both content and pedagogy to produce a potential
turning point in the way we educate our students. A number of law
initiatives in the past few years, and
schools have announced major
2 7
0
so.
do
to
planning
are
others
The bad news is there have been related calls for change of legal
education before, with a limited degree of success. Institutional and
individual inertia, resources, and other factors have played a role then as they
do now in limiting change.
What would such a change look like? As the former general counsel of
General Electric recently put it, there ought be more emphasis in law school
on "creating, rather than critiquing. 20 8 Students might be asked to write a
strategy memo for a multinational corporation seeking to do business in
China but worried about how to deal with the risks of corruption,20 9 or an

options memo for a data broker or search engine facing parallel challenges to
privacy concerns through litigation, state and federal regulatory bodies, and
on the public-relations front.210 Should the company implement an internal
system of self-regulation, an industry-wide one, or neither? Or2 11should the
company press for federal standards and try to preempt state law?

204. See Baldas, supra note 6, at SI; Press Release, Stanford Law Sch., A "3D" JD: Stanford
Law School Announces New Model for Legal Education (Nov. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/news/pr/47/ (describing such simulation courses as part of the
curricular-reform effort).
205. See infra note 216.
206. See Baldas, supra note 6, at S5 (recounting responses to Northwestern University School
of Law focus groups asking managing partners what competencies students need to be successful
lawyers: project-manager and leadership skills, teamwork skills, and understanding legal strategy).
207. Association of American Law Schools, Reassessing Our Roles as Scholars and Educators
in Light of Change, http://www.aals.org/am2008/friday/index.html#plenary.
208. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596, 608 (2007).
209. Heineman describes this as one of his challenges at General Electric. See id.

210. See Ludington, supra note 97, at 154-58, 173 (describing three private-sector security
breaches and the ensuing state and federal legislative responses, and proposing a new tort for misuse
of personal information in order to protect privacy interests).
211. This appears to be the strategy of several industries today. See Eric Lipton & Gardiner
Harris, In Turnaround,Industries Seek U.S. Regulations,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at Al.
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Some of the new governance scholars have explored the meaning of
"lawyering for a new democracy" in the context of public-interest
lawyering,2 12 but it need not be confined to that context. Besides the
examples above, one can think of countless others. For example, from my
own experience working at a major research university, I recall lawyers
working with scientists and administrators to come up with a system for approving and monitoring stem-cell research experiments, and ensuring that
federal-government money was not used for such research.2 13 Students could
be asked to work in teams to come up with creative solutions to similar
problems. After all, lawyers and their clients are not mere passive recipients
of regulatory output from government; they help shape regulatory regimes in
fundamental ways.
In future editions, Heinzerling and Tushnet can do more along these
lines. So when the authors discuss cost-benefit analysis in Chapter 9, they
might include a scenario where students represent a company or trade association preparing to submit materials to an agency undertaking cost-benefit
analysis of a particular regulation. And students could be asked how exactly
they would make the case.
Similarly, in discussing the ways that regulation can fail in the same
chapter, students as lawyers representing clients might be asked how strongly
they would oppose or push for a particular regulation. If they are representing a regulated entity, for example, but the enforcement mechanism is weak
or not likely to work, perhaps they ought to spend their political capital
elsewhere. On the flip side, students might think about whether there are
scenarios where requesting more regulation might benefit their clients, as
Mattel is currently doing in asking for more regulation of imported toys, or
as Google is in asking for privacy standards so that they do not have to do
more than their competitors. 214
Such an approach would approximate more the "case method" in
business schools, placing students in real-world situations and asking them to
think through options for dealing with the situation at hand.215 It would not

212. See Symposium, Lawyering for a New Democracy, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 271; see also
Sturm, supra note 176, at 129 ("[The] image and practice of lawyer as gladiator is not descriptive of
the range of roles that many lawyers play or of how many lawyers work ... ").
213. See Alvin Powell, Vigilant Eyes Oversee Stem Cell Research, HARV. U. GAZETTE, Apr.
22, 2004, at S7, S7, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/04.22/99-Stem
Ethics.html (describing the board of scientists and ethicists that oversaw Harvard's efforts).
214. See, e.g., Lipton & Harris, supra note 211, at A 13 ("American toymakers recently asked
the federal government to allow the Consumer Product Safety Commission to require premarket
safety testing of all toys."); Google Lobbiesfor Privacy Standards, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 15,
2007, at C2 (reporting that Google has urged countries to adopt a set of uniform privacy rules).
215. See Heineman, supra note 208, at 608 (arguing that law schools should develop "complex,
interdisciplinary case studies" like those in business and public policy schools "to illuminate the
multiple dimensions of issues and processes"); Rakoff & Minow, supra note 169, 603-05
(comparing the use of case studies at business schools and law schools); Robert J. Rhee, Follow the
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involve reading cases in the sense of appellate opinions except as background
for understanding the legal landscape; walking through those "cases" would
not be a focus in class as it is in most law-school classes.2t 6
V.

Conclusion

The fate of the project at the heart of each book is inextricably linked to
the other. For the new governance scholars, the success of new governance
as an overarching regulatory theory depends, at least in the United States, on
the next generation of lawyers having the skills and inclination to overcome
the culture of adversarial legalism that pervades policy implementation
today. That is, in determining the success of new governance as a model for
the twenty-first-century regulatory state, the training and receptivity of lawyers may well be an explanatory variable.
By the same token, for public law curricular reformers like Tushnet and
Heinzerling, their book only succeeds if it provides adequate tools to the next
generation of lawyers to be effective in the twenty-first-century regulatory
state. To be sure, there is an as yet unanswerable question here: What will
the U.S. regulatory state look like in twenty years? But I suspect that the
new governance scholars may be more right about the future than Tushnet
thinks and that the materials and skills in The Regulatory and Administrative
State are therefore inadequate preparation for the twenty-first-century regulatory state.
The students who are trained by The Regulatory and Administrative
State will understand what it means to challenge agency-issued regulations in
the courts under the APA,2 17 but not how to work with a school district to
develop a plan to meet the goals of the NCLB law 2t 8 or a hospital developing
a system to protect information privacy under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 1 9 Yet the latter tasks are likely
to be more common than APA challenges for lawyers in 2020, and probably
even today.

M.B.A. Model, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 2007, at 22, 22 (arguing that law schools should incorporate the
business-school case method into the "structural fabric of the curriculum").
216. In their curricular reform, Harvard separated the idea of putting lawyers in "role" and
asking them to work as problem solvers by creating a separate course, given in between the regular
semesters, called Problems and Theories. HLS Curricular Reform, supra note 5. This may well
have been the result of a compromise among Harvard's faculty, see Rakoff & Minow, supra note
169, at 604 (indicating such exercises should "become prominent features of our required first-year
curriculum"), but pedagogically the same approach ought to be used in regulatory-state courses.
217. See HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 416-17 (excerpting Richard Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1975), which details the
theoretical underpinnings of the role of agencies in the APA).
218. See Simon, supra note 39, at 56-57 (discussing implementation of the No Child Left
Behind Act).
219. See Trubek, supra note 30, at 252-55 (discussing the development and potential revision
of HIPAA).
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At the same time, the new governance scholars could benefit from the
kind of comparative institutional analysis that Heinzerling and Tushnet teach
their students. For example, is the NCLB method of allowing states the
flexibility to define standards for students really likely to lead to higher student achievement than if the federal government set the standards itself? If
so, why? This kind of comparative analysis is frequently absent from the
inevitability narrative advanced by some of the new governance scholars.
As we move more or less toward a new constitutional order in the
United States, we must understand the kinds of regulatory mechanisms that
are likely to be effective and train tomorrow's lawyers to represent their clients effectively within such a regulatory framework. Together, these two
books are a promising start.
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